The Inescapable Paradox of Eliminativism in Consciousness

Eliminativism in the philosophy of mind argues that concepts like 'qualia' and 'phenomenal consciousness' are flawed and should be discarded, focusing instead on what neuroscience can reveal. This approach aims to bypass the 'hard problem' of consciousness, which involves explaining subjective experience in a physical reality. However, eliminativism faces a paradox: it must use the very concepts it seeks to eliminate to articulate its stance, thus undermining itself.

Eliminativists, like Daniel Dennett, distinguish between ordinary language (P1) and theoretical language (P2) about experiences. They accept everyday expressions of pain or sadness but reject their use in serious theory, claiming these concepts are too confused for theoretical discourse. This creates a trap: to enforce the boundary between P1 and P2, one must define it using the concepts deemed nonsensical.

The argument unfolds by showing that applying the eliminativist boundary (B) requires treating ordinary experience-talk (P1) as sensical within a theoretical context, which is precisely what eliminativism seeks to avoid. This leads to a contradiction: if P1 can be sensically used in theory, then P2 is not nonsensical, invalidating the eliminativist's justification.

Critics might compare this to the elimination of 'phlogiston' in chemistry, but the analogy fails because eliminativists do not discard ordinary experience-talk. They must distinguish between ordinary and theoretical uses, which inherently involves theoretical discourse, thus breaching their own rule.

Other objections, like comparing qualia to unicorns or emphasizing public use of language, also falter. If qualia are like unicorns, they are coherent enough for theoretical discussion, contradicting eliminativism. The eliminativist's need to correct misconceptions about experience-talk implies these concepts have semantic content, refuting their own stance.

Ultimately, eliminativism about qualia is self-defeating because it cannot maintain the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable uses of experience-talk without engaging in the very theoretical discourse it deems nonsensical. This paradox reveals the logical instability of eliminativism in the context of consciousness.